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affects  behavior;  however  the  effect  is  significantly  greater  when  the  task  is  framed  as  a  financial 





































distinguish  between  financial,  gambling,  social,  ethical,  recreational,  and  health  safety  risks.  
















































































A  total  of  50  subjects,  drawn  from  the  undergraduate  student  population  at  Chapman  University, 
participated in the experiment.  While some of the subjects had participated in unrelated economics 















































  Coefficient  p‐value  Coefficient  p‐value  Coefficient  p‐value 
Constant      5.456*  0.073     3.649  0.246     1.807  0.277 
FDom        ‐0.803***  0.009     ‐0.446*  0.095     ‐0.357*  0.096 
GDom   0.232  0.539     0.313  0.403 ‐ 0.080  0.806 
Age   0.177  0.210     0.198  0.195 ‐ 0.020  0.336 
Male ‐ 0.043  0.928 ‐ 0.333  0.437     0.290  0.526 




























































































































  Coefficient  p‐value  Coefficient  p‐value  Coefficient  p‐value 
Constant        0.664***  <0.001       0.759*** <0.001 ‐ 0.095  0.309 
FDom  0.019  0.239  0.004  0.842     0.015  0.384 
GDom     ‐0.036**  0.015     ‐0.049***  0.007     0.013  0.580 
Age     0.006*  0.051     0.007**  0.032 ‐ 0.002  0.647 
Male  0.004  0.858 ‐ 0.006  0.821     0.010  0.754 










in  the  first  price  auction  and  relatively  less  risk  averse  in  the  Dutch  auction  as  evidenced  by  the 
coefficients on DFirst. This suggests that subjects are relatively more risk averse in their second auction 
format,  regardless  of  format.  From  (3)  the  difference  in  behavior  between  auctions  is  larger  when 
subjects experience the Dutch auction first. 
6.  Conclusions 
The  standard  economic  model  assumes  that  people  walk  around  with  hard  and  fast  choice  rules 





























believe  that  there  is  sufficient  evidence  that  a  multi‐domain  approach  has  merit  and  should  be 






























































10-14 Deck, C. and Nikiforakis, N. Perfect and Imperfect Real-Time Monitoring in a Minimum-Effort 
Game.   
10-13 Deck, C. and Gu, J. Price Increasing Competition? Experimental Evidence. 
10-12 Kovenock, D., Roberson, B.,and Sheremeta, R. The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link 
Networks. 
10-11 Wilson, B., Jaworski, T., Schurter, K. and  Smyth, A. An Experimental Economic History of 
Whalers’ Rules of Capture.  
10-10 DeScioli, P. and Wilson, B. Mine and Thine: The Territorial Foundations of Human Property. 
10-09 Cason, T., Masters, W. and Sheremeta, R. Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize 
Contests: An Experimental Study. 
10-08 Savikhin, A. and Sheremeta, R. Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and Cooperative 
Environments. 
10-07 Chowdhury, S. and Sheremeta, R. A generalized Tullock contest. 
  
10-06 Chowdhury, S. and Sheremeta, R. The Equivalence of Contests. 
  
10-05 Shields, T. Do Analysts Tell the Truth? Do Shareholders Listen? An Experimental Study of 
Analysts' Forecasts and Shareholder Reaction. 
  
10-04 Lin, S. and Rassenti, S. Are Under- and Over-reaction the Same Matter? A Price Inertia based 
Account. 
  
10-03 Lin, S. Gradual Information Diffusion and Asset Price Momentum. 
  
10-02 Gjerstad, S. and Smith, V. Household expenditure cycles and economic cycles, 1920 – 2010. 
  
10-01 Dickhaut, J., Lin, S., Porter, D. and Smith, V. Durability, Re-trading and Market Performance.  
2009 
09-11 Hazlett, T., Porter, D., Smith, V. Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity OF Ronald Coase. 
  
09-10 Sheremeta, R. Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests. 
  
09-09 Sheremeta, R. and Zhang, J. Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in Contests? 
  
09-08 Sheremeta, R. and Zhang, J. Multi-Level Trust Game with "Insider" Communication.   
09-07 Price, C. and Sheremeta, R. Endowment Effects in Contests.  
  
09-06 Cason, T., Savikhin, A. and Sheremeta, R. Cooperation Spillovers in Coordination Games. 
  
09-05 Sheremeta, R. Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation.  
  
09-04 Sheremeta, R. Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests. 
  
09-03 Smith, A., Skarbek, D., and Wilson, B. Anarchy, Groups, and Conflict: An Experiment on the 
Emergence of Protective Associations. 
09-02 Jaworski, T. and Wilson, B. Go West Young Man: Self-selection and Endogenous Property Rights. 
09-01 Gjerstad, S. Housing Market Price Tier Movements in an Expansion and Collapse. 
2008  
08-10 Dickhaut, J., Houser, D., Aimone, J., Tila, D. and Johnson, C. High Stakes Behavior with Low 
Payoffs: Inducing Preferences with Holt-Laury Gambles.  
08-09 Stecher, J., Shields, T. and Dickhaut, J. Generating Ambiguity in the Laboratory.  
08-08 Stecher, J., Lunawat, R., Pronin, K. and Dickhaut, J. Decision Making and Trade without 
Probabilities.   
08-07 Dickhaut, J., Lungu, O., Smith, V., Xin, B. and Rustichini, A. A Neuronal Mechanism of Choice. 
08-06 Anctil, R., Dickhaut, J., Johnson, K., and Kanodia, C. Does Information Transparency 
Decrease Coordination Failure? 
08-05 Tila, D. and Porter, D. Group Prediction in Information Markets With and Without Trading 
Information and Price Manipulation Incentives.  
08-04 Caginalp, G., Hao, L., Porter, D. and Smith, V. Asset Market Reactions to News: An Experimental 
Study.  
08-03 Thomas, C. and Wilson, B. Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral 
Negotiations.  
08-02 Oprea, R., Wilson, B. and Zillante, A. War of Attrition: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment on 
Market Exit.  
08-01 Oprea, R., Porter, D., Hibbert, C., Hanson, R. and Tila, D. Can Manipulators Mislead Prediction 
Market Observers? 